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First, Lipset’s effort to understand the social bases of sta-
ble democracy encompassed one of the most powerful and
enduring themes in comparative politics, and built on the
work of many of the great political and social theorists, from
Aristotle to Tocqueville and Weber. Writing in 1958, with
democracy still largely a “Western” phenomenon and with
most of Africa still under European colonial rule, Lipset did
not anticipate that well over half of the independent states
of the world would become democracies. Yet clearly, the ex-
pansive scope of global democratic change and aspirations
has stimulated scholarly interest in its facilitating conditions.
Today, much of comparative politics revolves around this
issue.
Second, although his key thesis was remarkably simple
and concise—–“the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the
chances it will sustain democracy” (p. 75)—–his essay was
theoretically rich in identifying a nexus of causal factors
leading from level of economic development to prospects
for stable democracy. Only two of his modernization vari-
ables (national income and education) have stood well the
tests of time and more complex methods as drivers of de-
mocratization. But the key intervening variables that he
adduced—–changes in political culture, class structure, civil
society, and state-society relations—–have endured exception-
ally well as explanations, spawning in themselves vast sub-
literatures. To this day, these remain the key social deter-
minants of the democratic prospect (Diamond 1992; Lipset
1994).
Third, Lipset’s thesis was embedded in the larger body
of modernization theory, which would mobilize considerable
evidence demonstrating that rising levels of income and ed-
ucation have diffuse impacts on attitudes and values, and
through them on political systems. The effects are far from
neatly linear, but higher levels of economic development
do tend to generate the trust, tolerance, autonomous par-
ticipation, and valuing of freedom that facilitate democracy
(Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Inkeles and Smith 1974).
Fourth, Lipset’s hypothesis about economic development
and democracy—–advanced at the time with crude andmerely
suggestive statistical measures—–has since been supported
by a vast array of statistical studies. Although there is de-
bate about whether economic development actually causes
democracy, clearly economic development sustains democ-
racy (Przeworski et al. 2000), and virtually every multi-
variate analysis of the determinants of democracy identifies
economic development as a powerful factor. Moreover, con-
siderable case study evidence supports Lipset’s (1994) (fre-
quently overlooked) assertion that “a ‘premature’ democracy
that survives will do so by (among other things) facilitating
the growth” (p. 72) of the critical intervening variables, such
as broader literacy, a vigorous civil society, limited inequality,
and a democratic culture.
Finally, Lipset was also right in asserting that the stability
of democracy (uniquely among political systems) depends on
legitimacy, and that this belief heavily depends on effective
performance, especially early in a regime. Here again Lipset
gave us a rich set of propositions that have shaped political
science theorizing about the need for democracies to moder-
ate conflict, the value in doing so of cross-cutting cleavages,
and the importance for newdemocracies to avoid threatening
“the status ofmajor conservative groups and symbols” (p. 87),
a theme that resonates powerfully in the transitions literature
(e.g., O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986).
Lipset was not the first to make these various arguments,
but he was the first to state them clearly and systematically
to a new generation of empirical social scientists, at a time
when dozens of new nations were gaining independence and
when transitions to and from democracy would become one
of the dominant aspects of national development demanding
explanation.
At the high end of the spectrum of development, Lipset’s
theory has held up remarkably: all but one (Singapore) of the
25most developed states aredemocracies, anddemocracyhas
never broken down once established in a relatively rich coun-
try (Przeworski et al. 2000). However, contrary to Lipset’s
expectation, about two in every five poor countries (with low
“human development” on the UNDP scale) are democracies
today. It remains to be seen whether these countries can con-
solidate democracy, but to the extent they do so it will be by
accumulating legitimacy through effective performance and
by building up the supporting social and cultural requisites
that Lipset identified in his seminal 1959 essay.
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Much as we would like to believe that the high citation count
for this article is due to the brilliance and clarity of our argu-
ment, it is more likely that the count is due to our being in the
right place (that is, the right part of the discipline) at the right
time. In the 1960s and 1970s, serious quantitative analysis
was used primarily in the study of American politics. But
since the 1980s it has spread to the study of both comparative
politics and international relations. In comparative politics
we see in the 20 most cited Review articles Hibbs’s (1977)
and Cameron’s (1978) quantitative analyses of the political
economy of advanced industrial societies; in international
relations we see Maoz and Russett’s (1993) analysis of the
democratic peace; and these studies have been followed by
myriad others. Our article contributed to the methodology
for analyzing what has become the principal type of data
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used in the study of comparative politics; a related article
(Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998), which has also had a good
citation history, dealt with analyzing this type of data with a
binary dependent variable, data heavily used in conflict stud-
ies similar to that of Maoz and Russett’s. Thus the citations
to our methodological discussions reflect the huge amount
of work now being done in the quantitative analysis of both
comparative politics and international relations.
Our methodology deals with the analysis of time-series–
cross-section (TSCS) data. Quantitative comparative politics
and international relations have leaned heavily on this type of
data since the early 1990s. The early quantitative research in
comparative politics, such as Cameron’s (1978), used simple
cross-sectional regression on typically fewer than 20 coun-
tries. With so few observations, it was impossible to tease out
complicated relationships. The late 1980s saw arguments over
whether results were stable if a single country was excluded.
The alternativewas to usemore standard time-series analysis,
but to examine each nation’s time-series separately, as was
done by Hibbs (1977). TSCS analysis pools these time series,
allowing for rigorous quantitative analysis of both the tem-
poral and the spatial dimensions of the data. TSCS data are
complicated, and users of such data have been very interested
in the appropriate methods for analyzing these complicated
data.
Our article is also heavily cited because it deals with im-
portant issues relevant to political science research. Twenty
years ago the small coterie of political methodologists taught
out of standard econometrics texts. But the issues relevant
to political scientists are not necessarily those relevant to
economists. In our case, econometricians have developed so-
phisticated methods for studying panel data, which appear
to look like TSCS data. Given econometricians’ interests,
they focused on data sets in which the cross-sectional units
consisted of a huge number of survey respondents observed
over a very small number of survey waves. Methods suit-
able for the analysis of panel data are not appropriate for
TSCS data, and vice-versa. One reason our work is cited by
political scientists is that as political scientists we worked
on methodological issues relevant to the study of political
questions.
Our article also reflects a growing interest in the finite sam-
ple properties of the estimators we all use. Econometricians
tend to live and die by asymptotic properties; but we all have
finite samples and sometimes what is good asymptotically is
not good for finite samples.We started with a commonly used
estimator that was fine asymptotically but displayed rather
poor finite sample performance (at least for typical TSCS
data). We showed that in typical data sets least squares,
combined with a correction for standard errors, could be
a huge improvement over the “asymptotically superior”
estimator.
In thinking about our article, we cannot help but remem-
ber that we submitted it to the Review after it was rejected
by the only other political science journal that at the time
published serious methodological articles. It is good to re-
member that a rejection letter is not the same thing as a death
sentence.
What do we wish we had done differently? The study of
TSCS data has become vibrant with many ongoing debates.
One point that almost everyone understands, or should, is
that there is no magical method (or statistical package com-
mand) for analyzing TSCS data. The most critical issues are
about specification, not about the choice (and surely not the
mechanical choice) of an estimation method. Because of the
context in which we were writing, we focused on estima-
tion methods, though we always tried to move researchers
away from mechanistic thinking about statistical analysis.
The ongoing debates have focused our current work onmore
critical issues of specification. But because we now live in a
world where methodological debates are commonplace, we
do not worry that we missed many important issues in our
article.
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The article started as a long paper on distributional inequality
in the advanced capitalist societies that I presented at the
1976 annual meeting of the APSA. Using OECD data on
the post-tax distribution of income in 12 countries, I found
that the extent of inequality varied inversely with the ex-
tent to which Social Democratic and other leftist parties had
governed in recent years. Control of government by left-
of-center parties was closely associated with the extent of
and growth in the extractive capacity of the state, defined
in terms of the ratio of all public revenues to GDP, and
the extent of and growth in extractive capacity were closely
associated with the degree of distributional equality. But
there were perplexing anomalies. For example, the Nether-
lands, where the Left had seldom governed, experienced the
largest increase in the ratio of revenues to GDP since 1960
and was the most egalitarian in terms of the post-tax dis-
tribution of income. Belgium and Ireland also experienced
unusually large increases in the ratio of revenues to GDP
despite infrequent control of government by left-of-center
parties.
Mindful of those countries’ high dependence on trade
and drawing upon Robert Dahl and Edward Tufte’s (1973)
discussion of the relationship between small size and trade
dependence, the work of Odd Aukrust (1977) and Assar
Lindbeck (1975) on “open” economies, that of Gerhard
Lehmbruch (1977) on incomes policies, and that of Robert
Gilpin (1975) on neomercantilism, I incorporated a measure
of openness—–the ratio of exports and imports to GDP—–in
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